

Online Appendix

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A1 Conjoint Survey Experimental Values

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and President Xi Jinping Jintao held a meeting at the 2014 Beijing APEC summit to discuss the improvement of Japan-China relationship, which resulted in an increase in interactions between the two governments.

Based on this, both governments have jointly considered a number of policy proposals that can affect the relationship between Japan and China. These policy proposals involve important issues such as politics and economics. Below, two pairs of hypothetical policy proposals will be presented three times. Although it may be difficult to evaluate some policies, please compare the two sets of policy proposals and choose which proposal you prefer between the two.

Table A.1: Conjoint table in English

Issue	Compromise
Yasukuni shrine	Japanese Prime Ministers will resume visits to Yasukuni Japanese Prime Ministers will suspend all further visits to Yasukuni, but give no formal commitment Japanese Prime Ministers will make formal commitment not to visit Yasukuni again
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands Sovereignty	Status quo is maintained and neither party claims sovereignty Both parties declare that Japan has sovereignty Both parties declare that China has sovereignty Both parties share sovereignty
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands Resource Development	Status quo is maintained and moratorium on resource development Resource development by Japan only [attribute not available if China has sovereignty] Resource development by China only [attribute not available if Japan has sovereignty] Resource development by Japan and China with the equal distribution of resources
Japanese Constitution	Japan will not to amend its constitution to validate the Japan Self-Defense Force (SDF) Japan amends its Constitution to validate the Japan Self-Defense Force (SDF)
Economic Cooperation	Japan maintains its current policy of achieving a free and open Indo-Pacific and competes with China's "One Belt, One Road" proposal Japan revises its current policy of achieving a free and open Indo-Pacific and coordinates with China on regional cooperation, adopting policy objectives of China's "One Belt, One Road" proposal
Japanese Tariffs	Japan increases tariffs on Chinese goods by 20% Japan increases tariffs on Chinese goods by 10% Japan makes no change to existing tariffs Japan decreases tariffs on Chinese goods by 10% Japan decreases tariffs on Chinese goods by 20%
Chinese Tariffs	China increases tariffs on Japanese goods by 20% China increases tariffs on Japanese goods by 10% China makes no change to existing tariffs China decreases tariffs on Japanese goods by 10% China decreases tariffs on Japanese goods by 20%

A2 Chinese Conjoint Survey Experiment Translation

我们知道，自习近平主席2014年APEC北京会议期间会见安倍首相开启中日关系恢复进程后，中日关系良性互动明显增加，高层来往增多。

基于中日关系的变化，两国政府正在考虑一系列影响中日两国关系的政策提案。这些政策提案包含了政治、经济等多个方面的重要议题。接下来，您将会看到三组假设的政策提案，每一组假设的政策提案包含两个可能的组合。尽管在一些政策中做出比较是困难的，请您尽可能在同一组假设的政策提案中，比较两个不同的组合，选取您评价更高的一个。

Table A.2: Conjoint table in Chinese

争点	政策案
靖国神社	日本首相继续参拜靖国神社
	日本首相暂停参拜靖国神社，但不正式承诺停止参拜靖国神社
	日本首相做出正式承诺，未来不再参拜靖国神社
钓鱼岛主权	中国和日本共同维持现状，双方均不享有钓鱼岛主权
	双方承认，日本单方面享有钓鱼岛主权
	双方承认，中国单方面享有钓鱼岛主权
钓鱼岛及周边海域的开发	中国和日本共同维持现状，不开发钓鱼岛及周边海域的资源
	由日本单方面开发钓鱼岛及周边海域的资源[由中国单方面掌握钓鱼岛主权时不可选]
	由中国单方面开发钓鱼岛及周边海域的资源[由日本单方面掌握钓鱼岛主权时不可选]
日本修改宪法	中国和日本共同开发并且平等享有钓鱼岛及周边海域的资源
	日本不修改宪法以赋予自卫队正式存在权利
经济合作	日本修改宪法并赋予自卫队正式存在权利
	日本推行独立于中国的“自由、开放的印度-太平洋”战略，与中国的“一带一路”政策竞争
日本对中国的关税水平	日本修改“自由、开放的印度-太平洋”战略并与中国的“一带一路”政策相结合，协调与中国的区域合作
	日本对中国产品税率增高20%
	日本对中国产品税率增高10%
	日本不改变对中国产品税率
	日本降低对中国产品税率10%
中国对日本的关税水平	日本降低对中国产品税率20%
	中国对日本产品税率增高20%
	中国对日本产品税率增高10%
	中国不改变对日本产品税率
	中国对日本产品税率降低10%
	中国对日本产品税率降低20%

A3 Japanese Conjoint Survey Experiment Translation

安倍総理大臣は、2014年の北京APEC首脳会議において日中関係の改善のために習近平国家主席と首脳会談を行い、その後、日中間の交流は著しく増加しました。

これを踏まえて、日中関係に影響を与えうる複数の政策案が日中政府により合同で検討されています。これらの政策案は、政治、経済などの重要な問題にかかわるものです。以下、二組の架空の政策案が5回ほど提示されます。判断が難しい場合もありますが、二組の政策案比較し、どちらがあなたにとって好ましいか選んでください。

Table A.3: Conjoint table in Japanese

争点	政策案
靖国神社について	日本の首相は靖国神社への参拝を再開する 日本の首相は靖国神社に参拝をしないが、これは公式の取り決めではない 日本の首相は靖国神社に参拝をしないと、公式に取り決める
尖閣諸島の領有権について	現状を維持し、両国は領有権を主張しない 両国が、尖閣諸島は日本の固有の領土だと正式に認める 両国が、尖閣諸島は中国の固有の領土だと正式に認める 両国で尖閣諸島の領有権を共有する
尖閣諸島周辺の資源について	現状を維持し、両国は尖閣諸島周辺の資源の開発を行わない 尖閣諸島周辺の資源の開発は日本にのみ認められる[中国の固有の領土の場合には不可] 尖閣諸島周辺の資源の開発は中国にのみ認められる[日本の固有の領土の場合には不可] 日中が共同で尖閣諸島周辺の資源の開発を行い、資源の分配も平等に行う
日本国憲法改正について	自衛隊の存在を公式に認める憲法改正を行わない 自衛隊の存在を公式に認める憲法改正を行う
経済協力について	日本は、現在推進している「自由で開かれたインド太平洋戦略」を維持し、中国の「一帯一路」政策と競合する 日本は、現在推進している「自由で開かれたインド太平洋戦略」の一部を変更し、中国の「一帯一路」政策と協調する
日本の中国製品への関税について	日本は中国製品への関税を20%引き上げる 日本は中国製品への関税を10%引き上げる 日本は中国製品への現在の関税を維持する 日本は中国製品への関税を10%引き下げる 日本は中国製品への関税を20%引き下げる
中国の日本製品への関税について	中国は日本製品への関税を20%引き上げる 中国は日本製品への関税を10%引き上げる 中国は日本製品への現在の関税を維持する 中国は日本製品への関税を10%引き下げる 中国は日本製品への関税を20%引き下げる

A4 Vignette Survey Experimental Design

Please read the hypothetical scenario below and answer the following questions:

Control 1 (Nationalist) Japan and China have both claimed sovereignty over the Diaoyu [Senkaku] Islands. Major Chinese [Japanese] media reported today that in response to the ongoing dispute, several thousand Chinese [Japanese] citizens planned to demonstrate to claim China's [Japan's] sovereignty in several cities. Chinese [Japanese] government did not interfere with the protests.

Treatment 1 (Nationalist) Japan and China have both claimed sovereignty over the Diaoyu [Senkaku] Islands. Major Chinese [Japanese] media reported today that in response to the ongoing dispute, several thousand Chinese [Japanese] citizens planned to demonstrate to claim China's [Japan's] sovereignty in several cities. The Chinese [Japanese] government did not allow the protests to continue, citing a lack of the requisite permits.

Control 2 (Economic) Major Chinese [Japanese] media reported today that several thousand Chinese [Japanese] citizens planned to demonstrate against deteriorating labor conditions at Chinese [Japanese] companies in China [Japan] in several cities. The Chinese [Japanese] government did not interfere with the protests.

Treatment 2 (Economic) Major Chinese [Japanese] media reported today that several thousand Chinese [Japanese] citizens planned to demonstrate against deteriorating labor conditions at Chinese [Japanese] companies in China [Japan] in several cities. The Chinese [Japanese] government did not allow the protests to continue, citing a lack of the requisite permits.

A5 Chinese Vignette Survey Experiment Translation

控制组 1(Nationalist Protest):

中国和日本都对钓鱼岛提出领土主张。根据主流中国媒体今天的报道，对于钓鱼岛争端，多个城市的数千名中国民众计划通过游行示威的方式，宣誓中国对钓鱼岛的主权。中国政府没有压制这一民众的自发行为。

实验组 1(Repression):

中国和日本都对钓鱼岛提出领土主张。根据主流中国媒体今天的报道，对于钓鱼岛争端，多个城市的数千名中国民众计划通过游行示威的方式，宣誓中国对钓鱼岛的主权。中国政府压制了这一民众的自发行为，宣称民众自发的游行示威没有受到官方批准。

控制组 2 (Economic Protest):

根据主流中国媒体今天的报道，多个城市的数千名中国民众计划通过游行示威的方式抗议一些中国企业恶化的工作环境。中国政府没有压制这一民众的自发行为。

实验组 2 (Repression):

根据主流中国媒体今天的报道，多个城市的数千名中国民众计划通过游行示威的方式抗议一些中国企业恶化的工作环境。中国政府压制了这一民众的自发行为，宣称民众自发的游行示威没有受到官方批准。

A6 Japanese Vignette Survey Experiment Translation

C1 (Nationalist Protest): 日本と中国両国は、尖閣諸島の領有権を主張しています。こうした中、日本の主要メディアによると、いくつかの日本の都市で日本の主権を主張するための数千人規模のデモが企画されていたとのことです。これに対し、日本政府はデモを阻止しなかったようです。

T1 (Repression):

日本と中国両国は、尖閣諸島の領有権を主張しています。こうした中、日本の主要メディアによると、いくつかの日本の都市で日本の主権を主張するための数千人規模のデモが企画されていたとのことです。これに対し、日本政府は、事前の許可申請がなかったことを理由にデモを阻止したようです。

C2 (Economic Protest):

日本の主要メディアによると、いくつかの日本の都市で日本企業における労働環境の悪化に対する数千人規模のデモが企画されていたとのことです。これに対し、日本政府はデモを阻止しなかったようです。

T2 (Repression):

日本の主要メディアによると、いくつかの日本の都市で日本企業における労働環境の悪化に対する数千人規模のデモが企画されていたとのことです。これに対し、日本政府は、事前の許可申請がなかったことを理由にデモを阻止したようです。

A7 Average Marginal Effect Charts Varying Development Status




Figure A.1: Chinese respondents: Probability of preferring deal by tariff rate and sovereignty, with joint development




Figure A.2: Chinese respondents: Probability of preferring deal by tariff rate and sovereignty, with sole development




Figure A.3: Japanese respondents: Probability of preferring deal by tariff rate and sovereignty, with joint development




Figure A.4: Japanese respondents: Probability of preferring deal by tariff rate and sovereignty, with sole development

A8 Balance Test

Table A.4: Balance test Japan

Covariate	Nationalism Control	Nationalism Treatment	Labor Control	Labor Treatment	p-value
Province	20.700	21.263	20.604	20.410	0.489
Age Group	5.328	5.390	5.537	5.577	0.059
Residence Type	2.372	2.388	2.346	2.382	0.533
Male	0.532	0.546	0.561	0.546	0.704
Education	2.464	2.487	2.395	2.401	0.116
Party Affiliation	3.315	3.459	3.500	3.496	0.695

Table A.5: Balance test China

Covariate	Nationalism Control	Nationalism Treatment	Labor Control	Labor Treatment	p-value
Province	11.671	12.265	11.993	11.642	0.336
Age Group	3.443	3.483	3.529	3.410	0.640
Residence Type	2.478	2.445	2.454	2.430	0.696
Male	0.515	0.491	0.522	0.505	0.578
Education	2.682	2.699	2.660	2.681	0.761
Party Affiliation	0.464	0.423	0.444	0.463	0.245

A9 Nationalism and support for discouraging anti-foreign protests

The tables below present tests for heterogeneous effects by pre-existing levels of nationalism, where multiple questions regarding nationalism are combined into a single “nationalism scale” using principle components analysis.

Table A.6: Nationalism and support for nationalist interference (Japan)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	Government Support
Government interference	-0.666*** (0.043)
Nationalist	0.236*** (0.024)
Government interference x nationalist	-0.193*** (0.039)
Constant	3.618*** (0.028)
Observations	1,663
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.7: Nationalism and support for nationalist interference (China)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	Government Support
Government interference	-0.596*** (0.038)
Nationalist	0.327*** (0.021)
Government interference x nationalist	-0.067** (0.033)
Constant	4.153*** (0.022)
Observations	1,820
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

A10 Multiple comparisons corrections

Table A.8: Multiple comparisons corrections China

Treatment	Covariate	Unadjusted	BH	Holm	Bonferroni
Nationalist	Party	0.0048	0.0112	0.024	0.0336
Nationalist	Education	0.2784	0.3898	0.8352	1
Nationalist	Trade	0.7031	0.7031	1	1
Nationalist	Nationalism	0	0	0	0
Economic	Party	0.0712	0.1246	0.2848	0.4984
Economic	Education	0.0024	0.0084	0.0144	0.0168
Economic	Trade	0.6114	0.7031	1	1

Table A.9: Multiple comparisons corrections Japan

Treatment	Covariate	Unadjusted	BH	Holm	Bonferroni
Nationalist	Party	0.0658	0.0921	0.1974	0.4606
Nationalist	Education	0.0169	0.0296	0.0676	0.1183
Nationalist	Trade	0.3837	0.4476	0.7674	1
Nationalist	Nationalism	0	0	0	0
Economic	Party	0	0	0	0
Economic	Education	0.0005	0.0012	0.0025	0.0035
Economic	Trade	0.8807	0.8807	0.8807	1

A11 Japanese results by party affiliation




Figure A.5: Economic treatment by Japanese party affiliation (group means and 95% confidence intervals)

Table A.10: Conditional Average Treatment Effects by Party (excluding Komeito)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Government support	
	Japan: Nationalist	Japan: Economic
	(1)	(2)
Government interference	-0.618*** (0.048)	-0.781*** (0.051)
Ruling party affiliate	0.373*** (0.072)	0.011 (0.070)
Interference x ruling party affiliate	-0.209* (0.113)	0.676*** (0.108)
Constant	3.530*** (0.032)	3.535*** (0.034)
Observations	1,663	1,668
Adjusted R ²	0.132	0.142

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01




Figure A.6: Treatment effects by party affiliation, excluding Komeito (treatment effects and 95% confidence intervals)

A12 Chinese results by political conservatism and nationalism

Table A.11: Understanding Party Affiliates' Tolerance of Government Interference with Protests (Chinese sample)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Government Support			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Government interference	-1.029*** (0.112)	-1.044*** (0.113)	-0.652*** (0.066)	-0.663*** (0.066)
CCP party affiliate	0.023 (0.057)	0.012 (0.059)	-0.058 (0.058)	-0.030 (0.061)
Government interference × Party affiliate	0.217*** (0.080)	0.218*** (0.081)	0.239*** (0.082)	0.235*** (0.082)
Political conservatism	0.172*** (0.024)	0.174*** (0.024)		
Government interference × Political conservatism	0.122*** (0.034)	0.123*** (0.034)		
Hardcore nationalist			0.564*** (0.058)	0.566*** (0.058)
Government interference × Hardcore nationalist			-0.130 (0.082)	-0.127 (0.082)
Constant	3.644*** (0.081)	3.589*** (0.130)	3.897*** (0.047)	3.744*** (0.117)
Covariate Adjustment	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	1,820	1,820	1,820	1,820
R ²	0.200	0.222	0.182	0.204
Adjusted R ²	0.198	0.205	0.180	0.187

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

A13 A Comparative View of the Liberal Peace Logic

The Liberal Peace hypothesis, which stipulates that economic interdependence creates a stake in the prosperity of trading partners, points to possible effects on the preferences of respondents engaged in international commerce. Some existing literature predicts only secondary effects compared to those of shared political institutions and values (Tomz & Weeks 2013). Our surveys in China and Japan also fail to turn up strong evidence for the liberal peace logic, although we do not rule out the possibility that businesses with large stakes lobby for peace.

We begin by testing for differential effects based on the trade connection between a respondent’s firm and China [Japan] and level of education (college education or no).⁴¹ We also create two additional dummy variables: the self-perceived importance of consuming Chinese [Japanese] products, and general internationalist preferences (if the respondent believes his or her country has mostly benefited from the US-led international system).^{42,43} The liberal peace logic predicts that individuals who are more influenced by Sino-Japan trade or hold strong internationalist preferences would dislike government inaction regarding anti-foreign protests, and endorse government actions—including interfering with popular protests—for the sake of more peaceful bilateral relationships.

We present the results in Tables A.12 and A.13, and Tables A.14 and A.15. For the Chinese sample, we find no evidence that higher exposure to trade with Japan is associated with support for government interference with popular protests.⁴⁴ College education is associated with higher baseline government support overall, and lower support for govern-

⁴¹These covariates were pre-registered as a heterogeneous treatment effects of interest.

⁴²These two variables are included simply for the purpose of exploratory analysis.

⁴³We acknowledge the scholarly debate on whether the U.S. system is based on power or liberal rules and institutions, and the mainstream media in China has portrayed U.S. rule as hegemonic, especially following the U.S.-China trade war in 2018. Yet we argue that in both China and Japan, those accepting the international order and of the U.S. and its western allies tend to be more liberal relative to their more nationalistic fellows.

⁴⁴Randomization inference derived p-values on the interaction terms are 0.70 in the nationalist treatment group and 0.61 in the economic treatment group.

Table A.12: Testing the Liberal Peace Logic (China)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Government Support			
	Nationalist	Nationalist	Economic	Economic
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Government interference	-0.624*** (0.050)	-0.686*** (0.078)	-0.548*** (0.050)	-0.378*** (0.076)
Trade with Japan	0.079 (0.056)		0.324*** (0.057)	
Government interference x trade	0.036 (0.093)		-0.048 (0.096)	
College education		0.013 (0.056)		0.178*** (0.058)
Government interference x college		0.101 (0.093)		-0.270*** (0.093)
Constant	4.139*** (0.031)	4.154*** (0.047)	3.848*** (0.032)	3.824*** (0.049)
Observations	1,820	1,820	1,819	1,819

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

ment interference with labor protests, not lower support for government interference with nationalist protests.⁴⁵ In other words, more highly educated respondents disapprove of government interference with protests at roughly the same rate as non-college educated Chinese respondents, but judge interference with labor protest more harshly than do lower-educated respondents.

Respondents who value Japanese products seem less discontented with the government's interference with protests (See Table A.14). On the other hand, internationalists do not seem to criticize government for inaction; yet they are more tolerant of the government's interference compared to others.

For the Japanese sample, we also find no evidence that higher exposure to trade with China is associated with changes in baseline government approval or reactions to interference.

⁴⁵Randomization inference derived p-values on the interaction terms are 0.28 in the nationalist treatment group and 0.002 in the economic treatment group.

Table A.13: Testing the Liberal Peace Logic (Japan)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Government Support			
	Nationalist	Nationalist	Economic	Economic
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Government interference	-0.650*** (0.046)	-0.538*** (0.069)	-0.620*** (0.047)	-0.442*** (0.067)
Trade with China	0.068 (0.105)		0.210** (0.105)	
Government interference x trade	-0.153 (0.174)		0.027 (0.192)	
College education		0.219*** (0.059)		0.245*** (0.059)
Government interference x college		-0.214** (0.090)		-0.323*** (0.091)
Constant	3.608*** (0.031)	3.485*** (0.046)	3.516*** (0.031)	3.400*** (0.045)
Observations	1,663	1,663	1,668	1,668

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

However, we find suggestive evidence that college-educated respondents have both higher levels of baseline government support and stronger negative reactions to both interference scenarios.⁴⁶

Additional exploratory analysis of the relationship between an affinity for Chinese products and being a self-identified internationalist on response to interference (See Table A.15) turned up no effects on government approval or reactions to interference. Internationalists have higher levels of baseline support for the government, but react more negatively to government interference than other Japanese respondents, even if that interference is in service of diplomatic tranquility.

Although we failed to find concrete support for the liberal peace among Japanese respon-

⁴⁶Exposure to trade and education were pre-registered as heterogeneous effects of interest. Randomization inference derived p-values on the interaction terms are: 0.38 and 0.88 for trade in the nationalist and economic scenarios, respectively, and 0.017 and 0.0005 for college education in the nationalist and economic treatment scenarios, respectively.

dents in this survey, we recognize, as Christina Davis (2003) has argued, that the views and actions of business owners and managers are likely to be a better measure of commerce-driven pressures on government policy.

Table A.14: Testing the Liberal Peace Logic (Chinese sample)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Government Support		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Government interference	-0.641*** (0.051)	-0.683*** (0.046)	-0.757*** (0.050)
Trade with Japan	0.069 (0.066)		
Government interference × Trade with Japan	0.043 (0.093)		
Japanese products		-0.280*** (0.082)	
Government interference × Japanese products		0.348*** (0.119)	
Internationalist			0.003 (0.063)
Government interference × Internationalist			0.444*** (0.090)
Constant	4.213*** (0.121)	4.240*** (0.120)	4.162*** (0.035)
Covariate Adjustment	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,820	1,820	1,820
R ²	0.129	0.134	0.129
Adjusted R ²	0.111	0.115	0.127

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.15: Testing the Liberal Peace Logic (Japan)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Government Support		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Government repression	-0.643*** (0.047)	-0.719*** (0.061)	-0.553*** (0.057)
Trade with China	0.033 (0.112)		
Government repression x Trade with China	-0.179 (0.159)		
Chinese products		0.006 (0.064)	
Government repression x Chinese products		0.139 (0.090)	
Internationalist			0.425*** (0.063)
Government repression x Internationalist			-0.267*** (0.089)
Constant	3.458*** (0.168)	3.455*** (0.171)	3.440*** (0.040)
Covariate Adjustment	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>
Observations	1,663	1,663	1,663
R ²	0.156	0.158	0.145
Adjusted R ²	0.128	0.130	0.144

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01