

# Online Appendix

## Table of Contents

---

<b>A Key preregistered outcomes</b>	A2
<b>B Covariate balance</b>	A4
<b>C Other outcomes</b>	A5
<b>D Mediation Analysis</b>	A15
<b>E Regression results for main outcomes</b>	A17
<b>F Differential attrition</b>	A22
<b>G Multiple comparisons</b>	A24
<b>H Video transcripts</b>	A26
<b>I Pre-analysis plans and surveys</b>	A34

---

## A Key preregistered outcomes




Figure A1: Key preregistered outcomes across treatment waves, part 1. Continues on next page.




Figure A2: Key preregistered outcomes across treatment waves, part 2. Excluded is the petition outcome, which was only asked in Round 1, and appears in main text Figure 4.

## B Covariate balance




Figure A3: Covariate balance. Treatment conditions compared with control conditions. 95 percent confidence intervals from two-sided t-test shown.

### C Other outcomes

Round Two Study: Treatments have no effect on perception of government services





Figure A4: Treatment effects of propaganda on self-reported satisfaction with government services on a 1 to 5 scale (5 indicating strong satisfaction, 1 indicating strong dissatisfaction). Each dot represents one respondent. Bars show 95 percent confidence intervals for the mean for each condition.

Round One Study: Treatments increase pro-China patriotism and hawkishness



Round Two Study: Treatments (mostly) increase pro-China patriotism and hawkishness






Figure A5: Treatment effects of propaganda on patriotism and hawkishness indices, created using principle components analysis. Each dot represents one respondent. Bars show 95 percent confidence intervals for the mean for each condition.

### Round One Study: Anti-foreign sentiment index



### Round One Study: Patriotism index



### Round One Study: Hawkishness index





Figure A6: Estimated treatment effects of viewing propaganda by individual question, Round One study.

### Round Two Study: Anti-Japanese sentiment index



### Round Two Study: Anti-American sentiment index





Figure A7: Estimated treatment effects of viewing propaganda by individual question, Round two study.



### Round Three Study: Anti-Japanese sentiment index



### Round Three Study: Anti-American sentiment index






Figure A8: Estimated treatment effects of viewing propaganda by individual question, Round Two study.


### Round Two Study: Patriotism index



### Round Two Study: Hawkishness index



### Round Three Study: Patriotism index



### Round Three Study: Hawkishness index




Figure A9: Estimated treatment effects of viewing propaganda by individual question, Round one study.






Figure A10: Treatment effects of propaganda on emotions on a 1 to 5 scale. Each dot represents one respondent. Bars show 95 percent confidence intervals for the mean for each condition.






Figure A11: Treatment effects of propaganda on emotions on a 1 to 5 scale. Each dot represents one respondent. Bars show 95 percent confidence intervals for the mean for each condition.


Marginal Effects of Anti-Japan drama on Anti-foreign sentiment



Marginal Effects of Anti-Japan newscast on Anti-foreign sentiment



Marginal Effects of Anti-Japan drama on Anger



Marginal Effects of Anti-Japan newscast on Anger






Figure A12: Marginal effects plots of Round 1 treatments on Anger and Anti-Foreign Sentiment outcomes. Estimates are generated by discretizing age into five bins and evaluating the marginal effect of the conditional marginal effect at the median point in each bin. A histogram of age distribution within the treatment group is displayed at the bottom of each plot to indicate the support of the age variable, which we originally measure in five-year categories (with the exception of the first category, which captures ages 18-24).


Marginal Effects of Hong Kong video on Anti-American Sentiment



Marginal Effects of Anti-Japan drama on Anti-Japan sentiment



Marginal Effects of Hong Kong video on anger



Marginal Effects of Anti-Japan drama on Anger





Figure A13: Marginal effects plots of Round 2 treatments on Anger and Anti-Foreign Sentiment outcomes. Estimates are generated by discretizing age into five bins and evaluating the marginal effect of the conditional marginal effect at the median point in each bin. A histogram of age distribution within the treatment group is displayed at the bottom of each plot to indicate the support of the age variable, which we originally measure in five-year categories (with the exception of the first category, which captures ages 18-24).

## D Mediation Analysis

Does emotion mediate changes in anti-foreign attitudes? To examine this question, we turn to mediation analysis (Imai, Keele and Tingley, 2010; Imai et al., 2011). We urge caution in interpreting the mediation analysis results. Since we have not randomized our mediating variable, anger, the core assumption of mediation analysis — the assumption of sequential ignorability (Imai, Keele and Tingley, 2010, p. 310) — is unlikely to be met. (As discussed above, we did not attempt to randomize anger in a design similar to Young (2019) because we did not believe that anger without an object would increase nationalism.) Since the assumption of sequential ignorability is unlikely to hold, the results here are only suggestive that emotion *may* be a mediator for nationalist attitudes.

The mediation analysis, while not conclusive, is consistent with the notion that anger mediates increases in nationalist sentiment. Figure A14 presents Average Causal Mediation Effects (ACME) (Imai, Keele and Tingley, 2010; Imai et al., 2011) for the mediation effect of anger on anti-foreign sentiment. In each case, the estimated mediation effect of anger on anti-foreign sentiment is larger than the estimated direct effect of viewing the video. We also find little evidence that the effects are mediated by emotions theoretically unconnected to the outcome, such as sadness. Again, given the limitations of mediation analysis and our design, we caution that these results, while consistent with our theory, are only suggestive.

Round One Study:  
Estimated mediation effects of anger on  
anti-foreign sentiment



Round Two Study:  
Estimated mediation effects of anger on  
anti-foreign sentiment






Figure A14: Estimated Average Causal Mediation Effects (ACME) for anger on anti-foreign sentiment (Imai, Keele and Tingley, 2010; Imai et al., 2011) using 5,000 simulations.



## E Regression results for main outcomes

Table A1: Round One: OLS Results for Main Outcomes

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Pro-China patriotism		Anti-foreign nationalism		Hawkishness	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Anti-Japan television drama	0.098*** (0.036)	0.092** (0.036)	0.377*** (0.036)	0.373*** (0.036)	0.199*** (0.037)	0.200*** (0.038)
Anti-Japan newscast	0.189*** (0.036)	0.196*** (0.036)	0.256*** (0.036)	0.261*** (0.036)	0.117*** (0.038)	0.123*** (0.038)
Age		-0.019** (0.008)		-0.038*** (0.008)		-0.020** (0.008)
Education		-0.163*** (0.019)		-0.100*** (0.019)		0.003 (0.020)
Urban resident		0.291*** (0.037)		-0.002 (0.037)		-0.144*** (0.039)
Party		0.088** (0.041)		-0.005 (0.041)		0.120*** (0.042)
Income		0.081*** (0.012)		0.069*** (0.012)		0.041*** (0.013)
Gender		0.072** (0.030)		0.021 (0.030)		-0.035 (0.031)
Hours watching TV		0.056*** (0.009)		-0.020** (0.009)		0.028*** (0.010)
Constant	-0.089*** (0.024)	-0.043 (0.087)	-0.198*** (0.024)	0.077 (0.088)	-0.100*** (0.025)	-0.240** (0.097)
Observations	4,438	4,291	4,431	4,289	4,159	4,065
R <sup>2</sup>	0.006	0.067	0.026	0.038	0.007	0.016
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.006	0.065	0.025	0.036	0.006	0.014

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table A2: Round One: OLS Results for Main Outcomes

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Anger		Would protest		Signed petition	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Anti-Japan television drama	1.436*** (0.043)	1.416*** (0.044)	0.021 (0.015)	0.024 (0.016)	0.038** (0.018)	0.026 (0.017)
Anti-Japan newscast	1.174*** (0.044)	1.137*** (0.044)	0.015 (0.015)	0.013 (0.016)	0.028 (0.018)	0.024 (0.017)
Age		0.023** (0.010)		0.003 (0.003)		-0.019*** (0.004)
Education		0.049** (0.023)		0.059*** (0.008)		0.023** (0.009)
Urban resident		-0.206*** (0.045)		-0.057*** (0.016)		0.208*** (0.018)
Party		0.006 (0.050)		0.013 (0.018)		0.021 (0.020)
Income		0.036** (0.014)		-0.022*** (0.005)		0.026*** (0.006)
Gender		0.019 (0.037)		-0.023* (0.013)		-0.047*** (0.014)
Hours watching TV		0.058*** (0.011)		0.012*** (0.004)		-0.011** (0.005)
Constant	2.598*** (0.029)	2.110*** (0.106)	0.226*** (0.010)	0.078** (0.038)	0.567*** (0.012)	0.351*** (0.042)
Observations	4,470	4,317	4,511	4,360	4,469	4,325
R <sup>2</sup>	0.221	0.225	0.0005	0.019	0.001	0.085
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.221	0.224	0.00001	0.017	0.001	0.083

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table A3: Round Two: OLS Results for Main Outcomes

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Anger		Anti-American sentiment		Anti-Japanese sentiment	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Anti-Japan television drama	1.514*** (0.069)	1.514*** (0.070)	0.070 (0.059)	0.058 (0.059)	0.352*** (0.058)	0.344*** (0.058)
Anti-US social media clip	1.456*** (0.070)	1.463*** (0.071)	0.220*** (0.059)	0.206*** (0.060)	0.077 (0.059)	0.065 (0.059)
Age		0.017 (0.012)		0.012 (0.010)		0.030*** (0.010)
Education		-0.014 (0.043)		0.029 (0.037)		-0.012 (0.036)
Urban resident		-0.061 (0.073)		-0.038 (0.062)		-0.233*** (0.061)
Party		0.002 (0.079)		0.091 (0.067)		0.060 (0.066)
Income		-0.009 (0.025)		-0.015 (0.021)		0.004 (0.021)
Gender		-0.012 (0.058)		-0.008 (0.049)		0.052 (0.048)
Hours watching TV		0.016 (0.015)		0.006 (0.013)		0.043*** (0.012)
Constant	2.566*** (0.051)	2.599*** (0.220)	-0.099** (0.043)	-0.194 (0.188)	-0.152*** (0.043)	-0.226 (0.184)
Observations	1,757	1,735	1,755	1,733	1,753	1,732
R <sup>2</sup>	0.254	0.258	0.008	0.010	0.023	0.052
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.253	0.254	0.007	0.005	0.022	0.047

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table A4: Round Two and Three: OLS Results for Main Outcomes

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Would protest government (Round 2)		Would protest government (Round 3)		Government is responsive	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Anti-Japan television drama	-0.002 (0.025)	-0.012 (0.025)	0.134 (0.088)	0.149* (0.090)	0.007 (0.044)	-0.005 (0.044)
Anti-US social media clip	0.009 (0.025)	0.005 (0.025)	0.100 (0.088)	0.095 (0.089)	0.036 (0.045)	0.031 (0.045)
Age		-0.017*** (0.004)		-0.020 (0.016)		-0.002 (0.007)
Education		-0.093*** (0.015)		-0.056 (0.055)		0.041 (0.027)
Urban resident		0.084*** (0.026)		-0.049 (0.105)		0.067 (0.047)
Party		0.058** (0.028)		0.130 (0.098)		0.135*** (0.050)
Income		0.017** (0.009)		0.001 (0.029)		0.008 (0.016)
Gender		-0.093*** (0.021)		-0.090 (0.074)		0.046 (0.037)
Hours watching TV		0.019*** (0.005)		-0.007 (0.022)		0.040*** (0.009)
Constant	0.250*** (0.018)	0.579*** (0.078)	-0.080 (0.064)	0.345 (0.302)	4.234*** (0.032)	3.804*** (0.139)
Observations	1,835	1,813	781	771	1,821	1,799
R <sup>2</sup>	0.0001	0.044	0.003	0.011	0.0004	0.022
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	-0.001	0.039	0.001	-0.001	-0.001	0.017

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table A5: Round Three: OLS Results for Main Outcomes

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Anger		Anti-American sentiment		Anti-Japanese sentiment	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Anti-Japan television drama	0.169 (0.111)	0.170 (0.109)	0.134 (0.088)	0.149* (0.090)	0.225** (0.088)	0.219** (0.089)
Anti-US social media clip	0.110 (0.111)	0.123 (0.109)	0.100 (0.088)	0.095 (0.089)	0.089 (0.088)	0.082 (0.088)
Age		-0.074*** (0.019)		-0.020 (0.016)		-0.019 (0.016)
Education		-0.115* (0.067)		-0.056 (0.055)		-0.068 (0.055)
Urban resident		0.003 (0.129)		-0.049 (0.105)		-0.002 (0.105)
Party		0.021 (0.119)		0.130 (0.098)		0.091 (0.097)
Income		-0.109*** (0.036)		0.001 (0.029)		-0.077*** (0.029)
Gender		0.197** (0.090)		-0.090 (0.074)		0.054 (0.073)
Hours watching TV		0.083*** (0.027)		-0.007 (0.022)		0.028 (0.022)
Constant	2.012*** (0.080)	3.188*** (0.367)	-0.080 (0.064)	0.345 (0.302)	-0.108* (0.064)	0.620** (0.299)
Observations	785	775	781	771	785	775
R <sup>2</sup>	0.003	0.059	0.003	0.011	0.008	0.027
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.0005	0.048	0.001	-0.001	0.006	0.016

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

## F Differential attrition

As Table A6 shows, the treatments in Round One induced differential attrition compared to the pure control group. Approximately 15 percent of the two treatment groups dropped out of the survey before completing the two treatments. Among those who dropped out, most did so without watching any of the video. In the hard propaganda treatment group, 87 percent of those who dropped out did not watch any portion of the video; in the soft propaganda treatment, 82 percent of those who dropped out did not watch any of the video. This difference in rate of clicking on the video is not statistically significant.

Table A6: Round One: Attrition across treatment groups.

	N	N completed	Attrition
Anti-Japan newscast	1663	1412	15.1%
Anti-Japan drama	1672	1430	15.5%
No clip	1708	1674	2.0%

Table A7: Reweighted results to account for missingness, using inverse propensity score weighting as described in Gerber and Green (2012).

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Patriotism (1)	Anti-foreign (2)	Hawkish (3)	Patriotism (4)	Anti-foreign (5)	Hawkish (6)
Hard propaganda	0.193*** (0.036)	0.262*** (0.036)	0.118*** (0.038)			
Soft propaganda				0.083** (0.038)	0.367*** (0.036)	0.188*** (0.038)
Constant	-0.094*** (0.025)	-0.198*** (0.025)	-0.095*** (0.027)	-0.094*** (0.027)	-0.198*** (0.026)	-0.095*** (0.027)
Observations	2,959	2,948	2,751	2,974	2,966	2,781
R <sup>2</sup>	0.010	0.018	0.003	0.002	0.033	0.009
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.009	0.018	0.003	0.001	0.033	0.008

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table A8: Trimming bounds for each estimated effect.

	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Hard propaganda - Anti-foreign	0.02	0.50
Hard propaganda - Patriotism	-0.15	0.48
Hard propaganda - Hawkishness	-0.12	0.45
Hard propaganda - Anger	0.57	1.88
Soft propaganda - Anti-foreign	0.12	0.63
Soft propaganda - Patriotism	-0.28	0.42
Soft propaganda - Hawkishness	-0.09	0.52
Soft propaganda - Anger	0.69	1.95

We take two approaches to understanding how attrition might influence the results, as recommended in Gerber and Green (2012). First, we re-weight the data based on the inverse predicted probability of completing the survey (Gerber and Green, 2012, Chapter 7). A key assumption of this approach is that missingness is independent of potential outcomes conditional on the pre-treatment covariates we observe, which is a strong assumption. Table A7 presents reweighted results for the main attitudinal measures. The other results also remain unchanged.

A second approach is to use sensitivity analysis to create bounds for plausible treatment effects. We use the trimming bounds approach outlined in Gerber and Green (2012) and Lee (2009). With this approach, we drop the upper and lower tails of the treatment group on each outcome measure, based on the differential amount of missingness in each group, then recalculate the estimated effects. A key assumption of this approach is monotonicity, or that treatment affects sample selection in one direction. The fact that most attriters did not watch any portion of the video arguably strengthens the plausibility of this assumption, but it is ultimately untestable. Table A8 presents trimming bounds for each estimate. The key results for anti-foreign nationalism and emotional response hold, although the other bounds suggest that there are plausible scenarios in which attrition may have influenced the other results.

The Round Two survey, which included a placebo condition, did not encounter a similar issue with attrition, and replicated the key results of the first study. Table A9 shows attrition across treatment conditions.

Table A9: Round Two: Attrition across treatment groups.

	N	N completed	Attrition
Anti-Japan clip	725	694	4.2%
Anti-US clip	700	663	5.3%
Placebo nature clip	636	590	6.8%

Table A10: Corrections for multiple comparisons.

	Uncorrected p-value signif- icant	Benjamini- Hochberg p-value signif- icant
Round 1: Anger	✓	✓
Round 1: Anti-Foreign Nationalism	✓	✓
Round 1: Foreign Policy Hawkishness	✓	✓
Round 1: Pro-China Patriotism	✓	✓
Round 1: Signed anti-Japan petition	✓	
Round 1: Protest government		
Round 2: Anger	✓	✓
Round 2: Anti-Foreign Nationalism	✓	✓
Round 2: Foreign Policy Hawkishness		
Round 2: Pro-China Patriotism	✓ (HK)	✓ (HK)
Round 2: Government is responsive		
Round 2: Protest government		
Round 3: Anger		
Round 3: Anti-Foreign Nationalism	✓ (Japan)	(Japan, $p = 0.054$ )
Round 3: Pro-China Patriotism		

## G Multiple comparisons

We take several steps to guard against the multiple comparisons problem. We preregistered our analysis and used indices to combine several questions into one measure. Here, we also report Benjamini-Hochberg corrections for the false discovery rate. For each round of the survey, we examine six key out-



come variables and two treatments for each, for a total of twelve tests for each of the three rounds of the survey. Nearly all of the main outcomes reported in the main text remain statistically significant at conventional levels. For the third round study, we only correct for tests that were significant in the prior round. After correcting for multiple comparisons, the anti-Japan sentiment has a p-value of  $p = 0.054$ .

## **H Video transcripts**

## Transcript – Snow Leopard

JAPANESE COMMANDER: Hello. I am Watanabe, the commander of this troop. I have come here today to create goodwill between China and Japan, and to build the Great East Asia Co-Prosperty Sphere. I've also come to inform everyone of a situation. It's come to my attention that the Eighth Route Army often comes by here and harasses you. We, the Japanese Imperial Army, have come here to protect you. If you know any information on the Eighth Route Army - the location of their headquarters, where their munitions are stored - then the Imperial Army will give you a generous reward.

That's right... I heard that the Eighth Route Army has a commanding officer named Zhou Weiguo, a former bandit who often harasses you all. The Imperial Army has decided to rid you of this pest. If you have any news of him, you may inform us.

It seems like we're still strangers to you. Don't worry. At any time, you need only give us information about the Eighth Route Army, and the Imperial Army will generously reward you.

Next, in order to truly express the goodwill between our two countries, I will have each of my soldiers pay a visit to each of your homes.

JAPANESE SOLDIER: (to villagers) Move. Hurry up, move.

JAPANESE COMMANDER: (to husband and wife) May I pay a visit to your home? Please lead me there.

HUSBAND: Commander, please.

JAPANESE SOLDIER: Hurry up.

HUSBAND: Commander, please. Let's go.

*[They walk to the family's house.]*

JAPANESE COMMANDER: (to Japanese soldiers) You two, go outside. If anything comes up, I'll call you.

JAPANESE SOLDIERS: Yes, sir.

HUSBAND: (To wife) What are you doing just standing there? Get the commander some water. Hurry, go.

WIFE: (To Japanese Commander): Water. W-water.

JAPANESE COMMANDER: Now, it's time for our countries' goodwill to begin.

HUSBAND: Commander! Commander! I have information on Zhou Weiguo.

JAPANESE COMMANDER: Is that so.

HUSBAND: It's true. It's absolutely true.

JAPANESE COMMANDER: How do you know this information?

HUSBAND: I often go by Yang Village. I saw it with my own eyes. They're just at - eastward from our village - less than 10 li - you'll get to where they are. Please spare my life. Please spare my life.

JAPANESE COMMANDER: Very good. You've provided us with some important intelligence. The Imperial Army will reward you very well.

HUSBAND: Please spare my life.

*[As the video cuts to an exterior shot of the house, we hear the commander shooting the husband, presumably killing him.]*

*Next the video transitions to a shot of the CCP-led eighth route army arriving. A caption reads "The eighth route army arrives."*

SOLDIER: Hurry! Keep up!

ZHOU WEIGUO: Let me have him!

SOLDIER: Those little devils! Your Yang Grand-daddy's come for you!

*[The Chinese army routs the Japanese forces.]*

JAPANESE COMMANDER: Curse them! Take cover!

*[The Chinese army surrounds and captures the Japanese commander.]*

## **Transcript – CCTV News Broadcast**

### **News anchor:**

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, the State Council of the PRC, the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, and the Central Military Committee held a meeting on the morning of the 13th at Nanjing Longzhong to hold a national memorial ceremony for the victims of the Nanjing massacre.

After a moment of silence, the military band performed a national memorial ceremony.

### **Yu Zhengsheng, Chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference:**

Only through a correct understanding of history can we create a better future. War acts as a mirror, allowing us to recognize the value of peace. The war of aggression started by Japanese militarism caused catastrophic suffering for the Chinese people, as well as causing great hurt to the Japanese people. The two nations of Japan and China should use the fundamental interests of their peoples as a new starting point, and more deeply treasure their hard-won peace. Thus, the two nations may contribute together to peace for humankind.

### **News anchor:**

Do not forget national shame, remember history. Today is the 80th anniversary of the Nanjing Massacre, as well as the fourth public memorial day for the victims of the Nanjing Massacre. Across the country, remembrances and memorials were held.

Today, at the Chinese People's Second Sino-Japanese War Museum, the Battle of Shanghai Memorial Museum, the Shenyang Manchurian Incident History Museum, the Shandong Taierzhuang Battle Memorial Hall, the Heilongjiang Japanese Unit 731 Exhibition Hall, the masses participated in mourning ceremonies, so as to remember history and treasure peace.

### **Interviewee 1:**

Today, we participated in national mourning. I think, most importantly, that we must keep in mind how deeply we suffered during that time, as well as how unyieldingly we fought in those battles. Right now, the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China has just been convened for the rejuvenation of our great Chinese people, and to build a more powerful, prosperous, and beautiful motherland.

**Interviewee 2:**

It's just as President Xi said. Our nation must stand up in order to become prosperous, and then to become strong. Our forefathers put forth great efforts. As for us college students, I think we must step up and undertake the tasks that our time has set before us.

**News anchor:**

Today in Gao'an, Jiangxi, in memory of the survivors of the Japanese massacre at Tuanshan Temple, 88-year-old Min Cui'e described her tragic experience, giving children a profound understanding of history. In Deqing, Zhejiang, local teachers and students watched an educational film about the Nanjing massacre.

**Interviewee 3:**

Only without forgetting the past can we open up the future. We only need to follow the disposition of the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, really work hard, realize the China Dream, and realize the great rejuvenation of the Chinese people. That's the best memorial to history.

## **Transcript – American role in Hong Kong social media clips**

Caption: What is really happening in Hong Kong?

Caption: Hong Kong used to be one of the lowest crime cities in the world

*Video of protesters marching.*

Caption: But it is facing the most serious situation since the handover [from the UK]

*Video shows shots of protesters blocking roads and occupying subway stations.*

Caption: Thugs blocking roads

Caption: Thugs using extreme measures to prevent people from returning to work

*Video shows shots of protesters destroying property and throwing Molotov cocktails and police stations.*

Caption: The initial demonstrations have grown into the violence rocking Hong Kong now

Caption: Destroying police station, assaulting the police, hurting citizens

Caption: Disrupting normal social order

*Video shows shots of taking the Chinese national flag down from flagpole and throwing it into Hong Kong harbor*

Caption: This escalation of violence is an affront to national dignity

Caption: The Chinese flag thrown off Tsim Sha Tsui Pier

*Video shows national emblem stained with ink*

Caption: The national emblem is desecrated

Caption: The dignity of the motherland

*Video shows officials installing a new national emblem*

Caption: China Liaison Office installed a new national emblem overnight

Caption: 1.4 billion Chinese people

*Video shows shots of crowds waving the Chinese national flag*

Caption: Patriotic and Hong Kong people spontaneously raised the national flag again

*Video shows shot of mainland Chinese person surrounded by angry Hong Kong locals*

Caption: Mainland youths go to Hong Kong for business trips, and hooligans surround them and demand they delete pictures from their phone.

*Video shows shots of Hong Kong locals yelling at an older man*

Caption: A 73-year-old man surrounded by thugs for not accepting a flyer

*Video shows shots of people yelling at protesters and yelling slogans in support of mainland China.*

Caption: Hong Kong citizens scold thuggish protesters for destroying Hong Kong

Caption: A Hong Kong separatist came to attack citizens with words

Caption: People at the scene: You are in your teens, why are you so stubborn?

Caption: More and more Hong Kong citizens stand up

Caption: Voluntary actions by Hong Kong citizens

Caption: The Hong Kong police are great!

Caption: Police come on! The police are great!

*Video cuts to foreign ministry spokesman speaking at a lectern.*

Foreign ministry spokesman: Senate and House of Representatives of the United States Congress reviewed and passed the "Hong Kong Bill of Rights and Democracy."

After passing, China responded as soon as possible ... China expresses its strong indignation and resolute opposition to the deliberations and approval of the bill by the U.S. House of Representatives and the House of Representatives. The bill supports Hong Kong's radical forces and violent elements and interferes with China's internal affairs.

The United States has more than 80,000 residents in Hong Kong, more than 1,300 businesses, and a large-scale investment. The passage of these bills by the US House of Representatives and the House of Representatives will only promote radical forces and violent elements in Hong



Kong and further disrupt Hong Kong. The result will not only harm China's interests, but also the United States' own interests.

No one should underestimate the firm will and determination of China to safeguard national sovereignty, security, and development interests, implement the "one country, two systems", and maintain Hong Kong's prosperity and stability. Any move by the United States that harms China's interests will be strongly condemned.

Finally, China strongly urges some people in the United States to recognize the situation, immediately stop promoting relevant Hong Kong-related bills, immediately stop interfering in Hong Kong affairs, and stop interfering in China's internal affairs, so as not to further damage Sino-US relations.

## **I Pre-analysis plans and surveys**

# How Propaganda Shapes Nationalism in China

September 3, 2019

## 1 Introduction

Does propaganda inflame nationalism in China? If so, how? Propaganda has long been central to the rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). National media outlets, such as the *People's Daily* newspaper and *Xinwen Lianbo* nightly news broadcast, are particularly important mouthpieces for the party's opinion, announcing policies, opinions, and slogans which are repeated widely afterwards.

Yet political messages delivered on these platforms tend to be dry and formal, heavily laden with official terminology and banal slogans. Previous studies are skeptical that these “hard” forms propaganda improve people's evaluation of the ruling party. [Wedeen \(1999\)](#), for example, suggests that hard propaganda in Syria does not instill genuine loyalty to the regime, but instead signals the regime's power. This leads citizens to comply with laws and act “as if” they see the regime as legitimate. [Huang \(2015, 2018\)](#) supports the idea of hard propaganda as a signaling mechanism using a survey experiment in China, showing that propaganda erodes government satisfaction while at the same time reducing citizens' willingness to protest.

However, hard propaganda is not the only tool that the CCP employs. It also expends an enormous amount of resources on what we term “soft” propaganda: the insertion of political messages into non-official media, such as television, movies, art, and books. Unlike hard propaganda, soft propaganda is often attractive or entertaining, potentially rendering political messages more palatable and comprehensible. Furthermore, the production and dissemination of soft propaganda is controlled by a massive bureaucratic apparatus, which has been documented by a number of scholars (e.g. [Brady 2007](#); [Shambaugh 2007](#)). We hypothesize that it is *soft* propaganda which has become more powerful and effective as CCP has modernized its governance strategy. Our view builds off the work of [Perry \(2017\)](#), who argues that the CCP has successfully adjusted its propaganda messaging to be more relatable and emotionally appealing to the Chinese people of today. Perry sees the aim of this strategy as the cultivation of “cultural nationalism,” which in turn buoys the legitimacy and resiliency of the regime.

We seek to clarify how soft propaganda contributes to rising Chinese nationalism, with a specific focus on how the treatment of Japan in Chinese politics. While both soft and hard propaganda contain pro-Chinese patriotic messages (e.g. the theme of glorious national revival in the ubiquitous “China Dream” slogan), these messages also include significant anti-foreign elements. For example, amidst growing U.S.–China trade tensions, a Chinese state-run television channel replaced its scheduled prime-time programming with Korean War dramas with anti-American plots. The channel explicitly said that the choice was made to echo present circumstances ([Fifield 2019](#)). Amidst ongoing protests in Hong Kong, official state media blamed foreign interference, primarily from the United States, publishing videos that provided suggestive evidence ([Feng & Cheng 2019](#)). These types of content, which depict foreign organizations as actively intervening in, discriminating against, or otherwise trying to subdue China, are often followed by angry, outraged, and aggressive comments on Chinese social media, which themselves are bolstered by government-fabricated social media

content (King, Pan, & Roberts 2017).

This study explores the effect of hard and soft propaganda on Chinese citizens' nationalism using an experimental design. We expose subjects to either an excerpt of a popular television show depicting the Second Sino-Japanese War, which depicts both wartime Japanese cruelty and virtuous Communist fighters, or an excerpt from a Xinwen Lianbo broadcast which discusses broadly similar content. We then explore the effects on subjects' behavior and attitudes.

## 2 Theory

Theories of propaganda have historically focused on its ability to change people's attitudes and behavior. More recently, some authors have suggested that propaganda induces behavioral change by acting as a signal of government strength. We believe that hard and soft propaganda attempt to encourage different types of desirable behaviors. Broadly, hard propaganda presents itself as authoritative, credible, and educational. It usually comes directly from the state or from agents closely identified with it. In order to carry out its primary function, i.e. inform recipients' beliefs and knowledge of historical and current facts, it is often presented with the semblance of impartiality.

In contrast, soft propaganda is meant to entertain and divert, and the messenger is less likely to be, at least explicitly, the state itself. Soft propaganda conflates the messages of propaganda with appealing images and ideas, such as nostalgia for the past, daring military operations, or desire for a higher quality of life. By wrapping propaganda in a fictional narrative, political themes take on emotional resonance. These emotional stimuli may cause recipients to retain and internalize propaganda messages more strongly.

We build upon existing work that demonstrates how media and propaganda can successfully increase nationalistic and anti-foreign attitudes and behaviors. Adena, Enikolopov,

Petrova, Santarosa, and Zhuravskaya (2015) studied the impact of Nazi radio propaganda on anti-Semitic sentiment in Germany during the 1920s and 1930s. They found that radio propaganda was most effective in areas with historically high anti-Semitism, and was actually counterproductive in areas with historically low anti-Semitism. In addition, DellaVigna, Enikolopov, Mironova, Petrova, and Zhuravskaya (2014) investigated the effect of nationalistic Serbian radio on ethnic hatred towards Serb in Croatia. They find that despite a decade of peace since the Serbo-Croatian conflict, Croats who listen to Serbian public radio tend to be more nationalist and anti-Serbian.

Our study focuses the following effects of propaganda exposure: changes in emotions, perception of current and historical facts, pride in being Chinese, anti-foreign nationalism, and willingness to protest against the government. We view emotional change and perception of facts as the baseline difference between the impact of hard vs. soft propaganda. With regard to perceptions of facts, recipients of soft propaganda know that the material they are seeing is fictionalized and exaggerated, and probably do not take it literally. If recipients do adjust their perceptions of facts, they may do so in different ways or directions. On the other hand, we hypothesize that one of the primary functions of hard propaganda is to “educate” the masses into having a “correct” understanding of history and news. Due to its ubiquity and consistency, it plausibly reduces variance in beliefs and knowledge across demographic, class, geographic, or other lines.

We predict that soft propaganda also has a stronger impact on recipients’ pride in being Chinese than hard propaganda. By crafting compelling stories which exemplify shared values and speak to shared Chinese history and experiences, soft propaganda appeals to and evokes feelings of patriotism and pride of viewers. By the same logic, soft propaganda is also able to better stimulate anti-foreign nationalism. Whereas an official news anchor is constrained by the need to retain an impartial and authoritative image, fictional television shows and

movies can and do depict invasion and exploitation by cruel and immoral foreign parties, sometimes in graphic detail. These images, which are visceral reminders of the injustices and indignities suffered by China in the recent past, stimulate and reinforce viewers' anti-foreign nationalism.

Finally, we study willingness to protest, which relates to the hypothesis that propaganda induces behavioral changes by signaling government power. We predict that the signaling mechanism is stronger for hard propaganda, which is one of the most overt and ubiquitous indicators of government power. Hard propaganda is often identical across geographic and socioeconomic lines (e.g. the nightly broadcast of *Xinwen Lianbo* at 7:00pm by each provincial television station) and projects images of political and military might. We predict that these depictions of a monolithic, inescapable state reduce recipients' protest behaviors. The signaling power of soft propaganda is less clear. On one hand, it may also reduce protest behaviors by acting as a secondary signal of government power, since it is evidence of the CCP's propaganda apparatus' presence in "virtually every medium concerned with the dissemination of information" Shambaugh (2007). However, our pilot results suggest that the emotional stimulus of soft propaganda may empower individuals to act in ways that may run counter to the state, including speaking out or protesting.

### 3 Hypotheses

Hypotheses by outcome:

- *Emotion.* Soft propaganda causes negative emotional change (heightened anger, sadness, lessened happiness, pride); hard propaganda causes no emotional change.
- *Perception of facts.* Hard propaganda changes perceptions of facts, and causes treated subjects to have more consistent perceptions of facts. Soft propaganda has no effect or ambiguous effect.

- *Willingness to protest.* Hard propaganda decreases willingness to protest against the government, and has no effect on willingness to protest against foreign targets such as Japan. Soft propaganda increases willingness to protest against the government and against foreign targets.
- *Pride in being Chinese.* Soft propaganda increases pride in being Chinese, hard propaganda has no effect.
- *Anti-foreign nationalism.* Soft propaganda increases anti-foreign nationalism, hard propaganda does not.
- *Hawkish nationalism.* Soft propaganda increases anti-foreign nationalism, hard propaganda does not.

## 4 Design

### 4.1 Context

The topic of the Second Sino-Japanese War is a salient choice for examining hard and soft propaganda in China because it has been the subject of decades of film and TV dramatizations. Television dramas set during the Japanese invasion of China in the 1930s are a fixture of Chinese television, numbering in the hundreds each year, and still receiving high ratings and a large viewership. They are typically similar in terms of plot and visual appearance, focusing on the heroism and perseverance of Chinese military personnel and the savage cruelty of Japanese invaders. Furthermore, the memory of the war remains a major component of the CCP's claim to legitimate rule. The CCP has sought to portray itself as the primary defender of China during the war, downplaying the role played by Kuomintang force. It has gone so far as to cancel the premiere of a major film depicting the war against Japan, for the reason that it featured the KMT too prominently and positively (Myers 2019).



Since the election of Xi Jinping as General Secretary of the CCP in 2012, political activity centered on the war has increased. In 2015, a massive military parade was held in Beijing to commemorate the 70th anniversary over the victory over Japan. It was widely seen as a signal of political and military might. Two years later, the government dictated that textbooks be rewritten so extend the official length of the war by six years, renaming it “14-Year War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression” (1931-1945). According to the Ministry of Education, the purpose of the change related to “patriotic education” and emphasis of the CCP’s “core role” in resisting Japanese fascism (Hernandez 2019).

## 4.2 Subjects

We test our hypotheses using a survey experiment administered to 4,500 participants in China. We randomly assign participants to one of three groups, which receive different propaganda treatments: a control group, a hard propaganda group, and a soft propaganda group. The control group receives no treatment. The soft propaganda group treatment consists of a five-minute excerpt of a popular, recent Japanese war television drama called *Snow Leopard* (*Xin Xuebao*). The excerpt prominently displays the cruelty of Japanese invaders, and the virtuous actions of Chinese defenders. The hard propaganda group treatment consists of a five-minute excerpt of a *Xinwen Lianbo* news broadcast which covered memorials to the Nanjing Massacre victims. The excerpt covers military exercises, speeches given by high-ranking leaders, and interviews with ordinary people participating in remembrances and memorials.

Subjects will be restricted to the participants who pass an initial “attention check”, which takes the form of a pre-treatment question. Note that this is a pre-treatment attention check that screens subjects from analysis. It does not represent a post-treatment manipulation check, which has been likened to introducing differential attrition among treat-

ment groups, which risks “inducing bias of unknown sign” (Aronow, Baron, & Pinson 2015). We also include a manipulation check question for treated subjects after they receive the video treatment, which asks a basic question regarding the content of the video excerpt. However, we do not eliminate subjects who fail the manipulation check.

### 4.3 *Pre-Treatment Covariates*

Prior to administration of the survey experiment, participants are asked questions pertaining to their demographic and background characteristics, as well as their television and news consumption patterns. We collect these covariates for three primary purposes: (1) to ensure that our subjects are balanced across each of the treatment conditions, (2) to increase the precision of our estimates of average treatment effects, and (3) to test for the existence of heterogenous treatment effects by background characteristics. The balance test includes the mean value of each pre-treatment covariate, testing for differences between the control groups and each treatment group. We also report p-values corresponding to F tests of all treatment indicators to ensure that pre-treatment covariates are not correlated with random assignment.

### 4.4 *Treatment Effects*

The two primary outcomes of interest will be willingness to protest and level of Chinese nationalism. All questions are included in the Appendix.

To measure the propensity to engage in **anti-foreign protest**, we ask respondents whether they would be willing to sign a petition requesting that the Japanese government make a formal apology for its role in the World War 2. Respondents are given the opportunity to sign this virtual ‘petition’ and add their last name.<sup>1</sup> The outcome will be coded as 1

---

<sup>1</sup>We limit our petition to collection of last names in order to protect subjects and not collect any identifying information. Because of the small number of Chinese surnames relative to the population, it is practically impossible to use the surname to identify an individual given basic demographic information.

if respondents who agree to sign the virtual petition and 0 if they decline.<sup>2</sup> We will measure differences between the treatment groups and control, using a simple difference in means test (implemented in OLS) and also using OLS to condition on pre-treatment covariates to improve the precision of the estimates.

To measure the propensity to engage in **anti-government protest**, we ask the following question: If the government does not provide me with adequate medical care, education, or other services, I would:

- Go to court and sue
- Engage in a ‘collective walk’ (street protest)
- Go to a government website to complain
- Find a ‘back door’
- Do nothing
- Other (please specify:)

The outcome will be coded as 1 if respondents say that they would engage in a ‘collective walk’ and zero otherwise.

We disaggregate nationalism into pro-China nationalism, anti-foreign nationalism, and hawkish nationalism. For our measure of **anti-foreign nationalism** we focus on attitudes towards Japan. The following are the survey questions designed to capture anti-foreign nationalism:

- Q26: Do you agree with the following statement: Chinese leaders should quickly dispatch troops to the Diaoyu islands, even if doing so has a significant impact on the economy.

---

<sup>2</sup>Subjects can indicate that they “agree” to sign the petition but then decline to sign a last name. We plan to examine two codings, one in which respondents who “agree” but do not provide a name is coded as 0 and one where this is coded as 1.

- Q25: Do you agree with the following statement: The Japanese government has not sufficiently apologized for its aggression against China during the War of Resistance.
- Q54: What characteristics do you think the Japanese people have?
  - Warlike
  - Rule-following
  - Consistent in word and deed

Each question is answered on a 5-point Likert scale, which we will transform into a numeric 1 through 5 outcome. We will conduct two types of analyses. First, we will aggregate all six questions into one index of anti-foreign nationalism using principle components analysis (PCA). (Some outcomes will be reversed so that higher indicates ‘more’ nationalism.) Then we will compare the hard and soft nationalism groups to the control group using a difference of means test implemented through OLS. Additionally, to increase the precision of estimates, we will conduct analyses with the pre-treatment variables as covariates in an OLS model. Second, we will analyze each question independently using the same strategy. For the second form of analysis, we will report p-values corrected using the Benjamini-Hochberg in the article appendix.

The following questions are intended to capture **hawkish nationalism**:

- Q28: Do you think that China’s spending on national defense should increase, decrease, or stay the same?
- Q26: Do you agree with the following statement: Chinese leaders should quickly dispatch troops to the Diaoyu islands, even if doing so has a significant impact on the economy.
- Q52: Do you agree with the following statement: The best way to ensure China’s national security is to increase the strength of the Chinese military.

We will use the same analytical strategy as above, comparing treatment and control groups

using both an index and with individual questions.

Finally, we have a set of questions to capture patriotic, **pro-China nationalism**:

- Q53: Do you agree with the following statement: Even if I could choose to be a citizen of any other country, I would still choose to be a Chinese citizen.
- Q56: What characteristics do you think the Chinese people have?
  - Warlike
  - Rule-following
  - Consistent in word and deed

Again, we use the same analytical strategy as above.

We test our hypotheses that the baseline differences between hard and soft propaganda are effects on emotions vs. changed perceptions of facts using the following questions. First we ask subjects to rate how strongly they are feeling the following emotions on a 5-point scale: Sadness, happiness, anger, and pride. Then, we ask subjects to rate their view of the size of the following groups' contribution to the war effort against Japan: The Communist Party (CCP), the Nationalist Party (KMT), other Chinese groups, and international aid. We will use the same method as described above.

#### *4.5 Heterogeneous treatment effects*

We hypothesize that the effectiveness of the propaganda treatments at shifting emotions and attitudes will be affected by several factors. Firstly, there are pre-treatment effects due to the fact that subjects have likely been exposed and attentive to programs similar to those we use for treatment. The pre-treatment effects of primary interest are subjects' preexisting level of political interest and existing TV viewership patterns. For further exploratory analysis, we will also look at the effects of age, urban v. rural residency, party membership, gender, education, and income. We will test for heterogeneous treatment effects by interacting the

treatment indicators with the covariates listed above.

## 5 Power Analysis

We performed power analyses informed by an initial pilot of 410 respondents. The pilot tested two potential soft propaganda treatments (the effects of which did not differ substantially). For anti-Japanese protest, the survey is powered to detect an effect of 3.5 percentage points, assuming each group has 1,500 respondents, with a standard deviation of 0.35 on the outcome (as seen in the pilot), the typical desired power to detect an effect of 0.80, and  $\alpha = 0.05$ . The anti-government protest measure is powered to detect a similarly sized effect. In both cases, the pilot suggested the effect might be approximately twice the size we are powered to uncover; of course, these are preliminary estimates based on a small sample. For the attitudinal outcomes, our power analyses suggests we are well-powered to uncover any substantial effects. For example, for the defense spending outcome (Q28), which is on a three-point scale, we are powered to uncover an effect size of nearly 0.05 on three-point scale, assuming a sample standard deviation of around 0.52, as we observed in the pilot.

## 6 Potential Follow-up Wave

To measure whether the effects persist, we may conduct a follow-up wave approximately two weeks after the initial wave. The decision about whether to conduct this follow-up wave will be based on funding availability and the size of effects, if any, that we uncover in the initial wave. We will perform additional analyses to understand whether we are well-powered to uncover persistence. We will assume effect sizes approximately half as large as in the initial round and a sample size of approximately 2,500 (because of expected sample attrition). To calculate our estimates, we will rely on the assumption that whether or not subjects respond is unrelated to treatment assignment.

## 7 Conclusion

In this pre-analysis plan, we have described an experiment that will examine the effects of television propaganda on attitudes and behavior in China. We hypothesize that viewing different forms of propaganda – packaged as entertainment or hard news – may influence individual’s willingness to engage in protest against either a foreign target (Japan) or the domestic government. We also hypothesize that these forms of propaganda may influence nationalist attitudes.

## References

- Adena, M., Enikolopov, R., Petrova, M., Santarosa, V., & Zhuravskaya, E. (2015). Radio and the rise of the nazis in prewar germany. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, *130*(4), 1885–1939.
- Aronow, P., Baron, J., & Pinson, L. (2015). A note on dropping experimental subjects who fail a manipulation check.
- Brady, A.-M. (2007). *Marketing dictatorship: Propaganda and thought work in contemporary china*. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Carey, S. C. (2006). The dynamic relationship between protest and repression. *Political Research Quarterly*, *59*(1), 1–11.
- Chen, J., Pan, J., & Xu, Y. (2016). Sources of authoritarian responsiveness: A field experiment in China. *American Journal of Political Science*, *60*(2), 383–400.
- Davenport, C. (2007). State repression and political order. *Annual Review of Political Science*, *10*, 1–23.
- DellaVigna, S., Enikolopov, R., Mironova, V., Petrova, M., & Zhuravskaya, E. (2014). Cross-border media and nationalism: Evidence from serbian radio in croatia. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, *6*(3), 103–32.
- Fearon, J. D. (1994). Domestic political audiences and the escalation of international disputes. *American Political Science Review*, *88*(3), 577–592.
- Feng, E., & Cheng, A. (2019). China state media present their own version of hong kong protests. *NPR*. Retrieved 2019-08-14, from <https://www.npr.org/2019/08/14/751039100/china-state-media-present-distorted-version-of-hong-kong-protests>
- Fifield, A. (2019). As trade war grinds on, chinese authorities ready the populace for a long fight. *The Washington Post*. Retrieved 2019-05-20, from <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/as-trade-war-grinds-on>



[-chinese-authorities-ready-the-populace-for-a-long-fight/2019/05/20/11997968-7b0d-11e9-a66c-d36e482aa873\\_story.html](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/20/world/asia/china-japan-textbooks-war.html)

- Gerber, A. S., & Green, D. P. (2012). *Field experiments: Design, analysis, and interpretation*. WW Norton.
- Green, D. P., & Kern, H. L. (2012). Modeling heterogeneous treatment effects in survey experiments with Bayesian additive regression trees. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 76(3), 491–511.
- Hernandez, J. C. (2019). China, fanning patriotism, adds 6 years to war with japan in history books. *New York Times*. Retrieved 2019-08-30, from <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/11/world/asia/china-japan-textbooks-war.html>
- Huang, H. (2015). Propaganda as signaling. *Comparative Politics*, 47(4), 419–437.
- Huang, H. (2018). The pathology of hard propaganda. *Journal of Politics*, 80(3), 1034–1038.
- King, G., Pan, J., & Roberts, M. E. (2017). How the chinese government fabricates social media posts for strategic distraction, not engaged argument. *American Political Science Review*, 111(3), 484–501.
- Myers, S. L. (2019). Patriotic movie apparently falls afoul of china’s censors. *New York Times*. Retrieved 2019-08-30, from <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/26/world/asia/china-film-censor.html>
- Perry, E. (2017). Cultural governance in contemporary china: “re-orienting” party propaganda. In V. Shue & P. M. Thornton (Eds.), *To govern china: Evolving practices of power* (p. 29-56). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Schultz, K. A. (2001). Looking for audience costs. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 45(1), 32–60.
- Shambaugh, D. (2007). China’s propaganda system: Institutions, processes and efficacy. *The China Journal*, 57, 25–58.
- Svolik, M. W. (2012). *The politics of authoritarian rule*. Cambridge University Press.
- Wedeen, L. (1999). *Ambiguities of domination*. University of Chicago Press.

- Weeks, J. L. (2008). Autocratic audience costs: Regime type and signaling resolve. *International Organization*, 62(1), 35–64.
- Weiss, J. C. (2013). Authoritarian signaling, mass audiences, and nationalist protest in China. *International Organization*, 67(1), 1–35.

## APPENDIX: Full Survey Questionnaires (Chinese and English)

Q1 尊敬的受访人您好，我们是高校的政治学与传播学研究人员。我们邀请您参加一个简短的在线问卷调查。本调查的目的是为了解您对于电视节目以及中国社会，政治、经济的看法。您之所以收到邀请是因为您是年满 18 周岁的中国公民。本次调查大约需要十五分钟时间。您的回应将会完全保密，我们也不会收集您的个人信息（例如您的姓名）。我们非常感谢您能够参与这次调查。

作为本次调查的一部分，您可能被要求观看一段中国流行电视节目中的片段。该片段可能带有一些暗示性的暴力场景。本次调查是完全自愿参与的。您可以选择不参与本次调查。如果您选择参与本次调查，您可以在完成前的任何时候关闭调查。您选择不参与调查或中途关闭调查都不会受到任何惩罚。如果您对调查内容有任何问题，欢迎您通过下面的电子邮件地址与我们取得联系。我们将会尽可能保证您所提供信息的私密性。所有数据都会由电子方式存储并且受到密码保护。本次调查已经得到相关学术管理部门的批准。如果您对本次调查有任何问题和建议，请通过以下方式联系我们：微信 maijinlin16。本调查的负责人是耶鲁大学的麦锦林教授。您也可以通过电子邮件 maijinlin1@gmail.com 和他取得联系。我们建议您使用台式或笔记本电脑完成问卷，如果使用智能手机，请保持屏幕横置。

如果您年满十八周岁并且同意参与调查，请点击继续按钮：

- 同意
- 不同意

Q3 为了保证调查包含所有类型的人群，我们需要听取各个年龄段人群的声音。您的年龄范围是：

- 少于 18 岁
- 18-24
- 25-29
- 30-34
- 35-39
- 40-44
- 45-49
- 50-54
- 55-59
- 60-64
- 65 以上

Q4 您的性别是？

- 男
- 女

Q6 您目前在那个地区生活？

- 北京，天津，河北，山东，山西，内蒙古，江苏，安徽，浙江，福建，上海，

广东，广西，海南，湖北，湖南，河南，江西，宁夏，新疆，青海，陕西，甘肃，四川，云南，贵州，西藏，重庆，辽宁，吉林，黑龙江，港澳台地区，海外。

Q7 您目前主要生活在：

- 农村
- 中小城市
- 大城市

Q8 您的户口类型是什么？

- 城镇
- 农村
- 其他（请说明） \_\_\_\_\_

Q9 您的学历（包括在读学位）

- 小学或以下
- 初中
- 高中
- 大学本科
- 研究生或以上

Q10 您的政治面貌是

- 群众
- 共产党员
- 共青团员
- 民主党派人士

Q11 您去年(2018 年)的家庭年收入处于哪个水平？

- 少于 10000
- 10001-30000 元
- 30001-60000 元
- 60001-90000 元
- 90001-120000 元
- 120001-200000 元
- 高于 200000 元
- 不清楚/拒绝回答

Q12 为了控制问卷质量，本题目测试您基本的中文阅读理解能力以及对问题指示的注意力。请您跳过下面的问题内容，直接选择“其他”。请注意，如果您没有选择“其他”，您的所有回答都会被记录为无效。问题：您最喜欢上的课程是什么？

- 数学
- 英语
- 化学
- 历史

- 体育
- 其他

Q14 您平均每天看几个小时电视？

- \_\_\_\_\_

Q15 您对于政治事件感兴趣吗？

- 非常感兴趣
- 比较感兴趣
- 有一点感兴趣
- 完全没有兴趣

Q43 您平时经常收看下列哪种电视剧？请选择所有符合的选项。

- 综艺节目
- 都市爱情片
- 古装宫廷剧
- 抗日电视剧
- 警匪片/谍战片
- 其他（请说明） \_\_\_\_\_

Q18 您主要通过什么渠道了解新闻？（勾选所有适用选项）

- 手机新闻客户端（比如：今日头条、澎湃新闻、腾讯新闻、网易新闻、凤凰新闻）
- 微信
- 微博
- 中央电视台
- 人民报道
- 本地的报纸
- 本地的电视频道
- 其他（请说明） \_\_\_\_\_

Q44 您在过去一个月之内进行过下列哪些形式的娱乐活动？请选择所有符合的选项。

- 看电视
- 玩电子游戏
- 唱卡拉 OK
- 看电影
- 收听广播

Q57 在过去的一个月之内，您是否观看过来自下列国家的电视节目或电影？选择所有适用选项。

- 日韩剧
- 美英剧
- 其他外国国家

Q45 您是否赞同以下陈述：中国的年轻人倾向于花费大量时间独自看电视、玩手机或者使用电脑，而不愿外出并亲自做事情。

- 强烈赞同
- 赞同
- 既不赞同也不反对
- 反对
- 强烈反对

Q46 您是否赞同以下陈述：短视频分享和直播软件（例如：抖音、快手、斗鱼、YY直播、花椒直播等）中的视频内容与传统电视节目相比更加有趣和具有娱乐性。

- 强烈赞同
- 赞同
- 既不赞同也不反对
- 反对
- 强烈反对

Q59 您是否赞同以下陈述：总体而言，与收看中国电视节目相比，我更倾向于收看韩国电视节目。

- 强烈赞同
- 赞同
- 既不赞同也不反对
- 反对
- 强烈反对

Q60 您是否赞同以下陈述：总体而言，与收看中国电视节目相比，我更倾向于收看日本电视节目。

- 强烈赞同
- 赞同
- 既不赞同也不反对
- 反对
- 强烈反对

(Hard propaganda treatment introduction): 下面，我们请您观看一段五分钟以内的短片。当看完短片之后，您将被询问一些关于该短片内容的问题。然后，我们想问您一些关于中国社会和文化的问题。据我们估计，这些问题仅需要占用您五分钟以内的时间作答。本片段来自《新闻联播》。

Attention check (hard propaganda treatment):

Q74 下列哪些活动出现在了纪念仪式上

- 国旗降半旗
- 习近平与外国高官交谈
- 曾参与战斗的老兵们因为他们对于国家的贡献而获得了奖章 (7)
- 一座新的毛泽东雕像落成揭幕
- 无法播放视频 (请说明) \_\_\_\_\_

(Soft propaganda treatment introduction): 下面, 我们请您观看一段五分钟以内的短片。当看完短片之后, 您将被询问一些关于该短片内容的问题。然后, 我们想问您一些关于中国社会和文化的问题。据我们估计, 这些问题仅需要占用您五分钟以内的时间作答。本片段来自一部抗日战争题材的电视剧《新雪豹》。在本片段中, 一支日本军队刚刚进入一个中国村庄。

Attention check (soft propaganda treatment):

Q57 在本视频中, 那位中国父亲发生了什么?

- 他被捕了
- 他被证实一名共产党领导
- 他被给予了一些钱作为奖励
- 他被杀害了
- 无法播放视频 (请说明) \_\_\_\_\_

(No clip introduction): 下面, 我们想问您一些关于中国社会和文化的问题。据我们估计, 这些问题仅需要占用您五分钟以内的时间作答。

Q19 说明您现在体验到的下列各种感觉的强烈程度:

- 悲伤 (完全没有或几乎没有; 仅有一点点; 有一些; 较为强烈; 极其强烈)
- 幸福 (完全没有或几乎没有; 仅有一点点; 有一些; 较为强烈; 极其强烈)
- 愤怒 (完全没有或几乎没有; 仅有一点点; 有一些; 较为强烈; 极其强烈)
- 骄傲 (完全没有或几乎没有; 仅有一点点; 有一些; 较为强烈; 极其强烈)

Q21 您认为以下各团体对于抗日战争的最终胜利所做的贡献有多大?

- 共产党 (非常小, 比较小, 适中, 比较大, 非常大)
- 国民党 (非常小, 比较小, 适中, 比较大, 非常大)
- 其他中国人 (非常小, 比较小, 适中, 比较大, 非常大)
- 国际社会帮助 (非常小, 比较小, 适中, 比较大, 非常大)

Q25 您是否赞同下面的陈述: 日本政府目前尚未对其在抗日战争中的侵华行为做出足够的道歉。

- 强烈赞同
- 赞同
- 既不赞同也不反对
- 反对

- 强烈反对

Q26 您是否赞同以下陈述：中国的领导人应当尽快派出军队收复钓鱼岛,即使这样做会对于经济产生重大不良影响。

- 强烈赞同
- 赞同
- 既不赞同也不反对
- 反对
- 强烈反对

Q28 您认为中国的国防支出在财政总支出中所占的比例未来应当如何变化？

- 增加
- 保持不变
- 减少
- 不知道/拒绝回答

Q52 您是否赞同下面的陈述：确保中国安全保障最好的方式是加强中国的军事力量。

- 强烈赞同
- 赞同
- 既不赞同也不反对
- 反对
- 强烈反对

Q53 您是否赞同下面的陈述：即使可以选择世界上任何其它国家，我也更愿意做中国公民。

- 强烈赞同
- 赞同
- 既不赞同也不反对
- 反对
- 强烈反对

Q54 根据您平时的感受，总的来说，您认为日本人有怎样的特性？

- 日本人是好战的（强烈同意；同意；中立；反对；强烈反对）
- 日本人是重视规则的（强烈同意；同意；中立；反对；强烈反对）
- 日本人是言行一致的（强烈同意；同意；中立；反对；强烈反对）
- 日本人是恐怕中国崛起的（强烈同意；同意；中立；反对；强烈反对）

Q55 根据您平时的感受，总的来说，您认为韩国人有怎样的特性？

- 韩国人是好战的（强烈同意；同意；中立；反对；强烈反对）
- 韩国人是重视规则的（强烈同意；同意；中立；反对；强烈反对）
- 韩国人是言行一致的（强烈同意；同意；中立；反对；强烈反对）
- 韩国人是恐怕中国崛起的（强烈同意；同意；中立；反对；强烈反对）



Q56 根据您平时的感受，总的来说，您认为中国人有怎样的特性？

- 中国人是好战的（强烈同意；同意；中立；反对；强烈反对）
- 中国人是重视规则的（强烈同意；同意；中立；反对；强烈反对）
- 中国人是言行一致的（强烈同意；同意；中立；反对；强烈反对）
- 中国人是恐怕中国崛起的（强烈同意；同意；中立；反对；强烈反对）

Q32 假如政府没有为我提供足够的医疗、教育、或者其他服务，我将会（勾选所有适用选项）：

- 去法院起诉
- 参加游行活动
- 在政府网站上投诉
- 找熟人走后门
- 什么也不做
- 其他（请说明）

Q33 如果您愿意，您可以在向日本政府提交的请愿书上留下您的姓氏，要求日本政府就其战争行为做出正式道歉。 我们以下署名者要求安倍晋三就日本军方和政府在日本入侵及占领中国期间犯下的战争罪行向中国人民正式道歉。

- 愿意（请进天蝎姓名） \_\_\_\_\_
- 不愿意

Q39 请您对次问卷提供宝贵的反馈和意见。

---

---

---

---

Q1 Dear survey respondent,

We are a group of political science and communication researchers. We invite you to participate in a short online survey. The purpose of this survey is to understand your views on television shows and Chinese society, politics and economics. You have received this invitation because you are a Chinese citizen of 18 years of age or older. The survey will take approximately 15 minutes to complete. Your responses will be kept completely confidential, and we will not record any of your individual identifying information (e.g. your name). We are very grateful for your participation in this survey.

As part of this survey, you may be asked to watch a clip from a popular Chinese television show. This clip may contain scenes that imply violence. Participation in this study is completely voluntary. You may choose to not participate in this study. If you choose to participate in the study, you may still close the survey at any time while taking it. If you have any questions regarding the contents of this survey, we welcome you to contact us using the e-mail address below. We will do our best to ensure the privacy of all the information you provide. All data is stored electronically and password protected. You are free to decline to participate, to end participation at any time for any reason. This study has been approved by the relevant academic administrative department. If you have any questions or opinions regarding this study, we welcome you to use the following methods to contact us using WeChat username majjinlin16. The primary investigator for this study is XXXX professor XXXX. You may also contact us using the email address XXXX.

We recommend that you use a desktop or laptop to complete the survey. If you use a smartphone, keep the screen horizontal.

If you are 18 years of age and agree to participate in the survey, click the Continue button.

- Agree
- Do not Agree

Q3 To ensure that our survey reflects a wide diversity of people, we need to obtain responses from a range of ages. Your age range is:

- Less than 18 years
- 18-24
- 25-29
- 30-34
- 35-39
- 40-44
- 45-49
- 50-54
- 55-59
- 60-64
- 65 years or older

Q4 Your sex is:

- Male
- Female

Q6 In which area are you currently residing?

- Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shandong, Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Jiangsu, Anhui, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shanghai, Guangdong, Hainan, Hubei, Hunan, Henan, Jiangxi, Ningxia, Xinjiang, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Gansu, Sichuan, Yunan, Guizhou, Tibet, Chongqing, Liaoning, Fuilin, Heilongjiang, Hong Kong/Macao/Taiwan, Foreign Country.

Q7 Currently, you are residing in:

- Village
- Small or medium city
- Large city

Q8 Your hukou status is?

- Town or city
- Village
- Other (please specify) \_\_\_\_\_

Q9 Your educational attainment (incl. degree):

- Elementary school or less
- Middle school
- High school
- College undergraduate
- Graduate school or higher

Q10 Your political affiliation is :

- The masses
- Communist Party member
- Communist Youth League member
- Democratic Party member

Q11 Last year (2018), which category did your household income fall in?

- Less than 1000 yuan
- 10001-3000 yuan
- 30001-60000 yuan
- 60001-90000 yuan
- 90001-120000 yuan
- 120001-200000 yuan
- Greater than 200000 yuan
- Unclear/refuse to respond

Q12 In order to ensure the quality of this survey, this question tests your Chinese reading comprehension and attention to the question topic. Please disregard all the answers below and directly select "Other". Please note, if you do not answer "Other", all your responses will not be considered. Question: What is your favorite subject in class?

- Mathematics
- English
- Chemistry
- History
- Physical Education
- Other

Q14 Typically, how many hours of television do you watch each day?

- \_\_\_\_\_

Q15 How interested are you in politics?

- Very interested
- Somewhat interested
- A little interested
- Not interested at all

Q43 Typically, what kinds of television shows do you watch? Please select all that apply.

- Variety show
- Urban romance
- Period drama
- Japanese war drama
- Police or spy drama
- Other (please specify) \_\_\_\_\_

Q18 Where do you primarily receive the news? Please select all that apply.

- Mobile news app (e.g. Jinri Toutiao, Pengpai Xinwen, Tencent News, 163.com news, iFeng news)
- WeChat
- Weibo
- China Central Television
- People's Daily
- Local newspaper
- Local television station
- Other (please specify) \_\_\_\_\_

Q44 In the last month, which of the following forms of entertainment did you use? Please select all that apply.

- Watched television
- Played video games
- Karaoke
- Watched movies
- Listened to the radio

Q57 In the last month, did you watch any television shows or movies from the following countries? Please select all that apply.

- Korea and/or Japan

- United States and/or Great Britain
- Other foreign country

Q45 Do you agree with the following statement: Chinese young people spend too much time watching television, using their mobile phones, or using their computers by themselves, instead of going out and doing things.

- Strongly agree
- Agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Disagree
- Strongly disagree

Q46 Do you agree with the following statement: The content of short videos and live-streamed videos (e.g. Douyin, Kuaishou, Douyu, YY, Huajiao) is more interesting and entertaining than traditional television shows.

- Strongly agree
- Agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Disagree
- Strongly disagree

Q59 Do you agree with the following statement: In general, I prefer watching Korean television shows to Chinese television shows.

- Strongly agree
- Agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Disagree
- Strongly disagree

Q60 Do you agree with the following statement: In general, I prefer watching Japanese television shows to Chinese television shows.

- Strongly agree
- Agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Disagree
- Strongly disagree
- 

(Hard propaganda treatment group introduction): Below, we invite you to watch a video clip of five minutes or less. You will then be asked some questions regarding its content. Afterwards, you will be asked some questions about Chinese society and culture. We estimate that these questions will take you five minutes or less to answer. This clip is taken from Xinwen Lianbo.

Q74 (Attention check for hard propaganda treatment): Which of the following occurred during the memorial ceremony?

- The national flag was shown at half-mast

- Xi Jinping spoke with foreign dignitaries
- War veterans were awarded medals for their service to their country
- A new statue of Mao Zedong was unveiled
- Unable to play video (please specify) \_\_\_\_\_

(Soft propaganda treatment group introduction): Below, we invite you to watch a video clip of five minutes or less. You will then be asked some questions regarding its content. Afterwards, you will be asked some questions about Chinese society and culture. We estimate that these questions will take you five minutes or less to answer. This clip is taken from an episode of “The New Snow Leopard”, a drama depicting the war against Japan. In this clip, a Japanese army troop has just entered a Chinese village.

Q57 (Attention check for soft propaganda treatment): In the clip, what happened to the Chinese father?

- He was arrested
- He was shown to be a Communist Party leader
- He was given some money as a reward
- He was killed
- Unable to play clip (please specify) \_\_\_\_\_

(No treatment group introduction): Below, you will be asked some questions about Chinese society and culture. We estimate that these questions will take you five minutes or less to answer.

Q19 Please indicate how strongly you are feeling the following emotions:

- Sad (Not at all, a little, somewhat, rather strong, extremely strong)
- Happy (Not at all, a little, somewhat, rather strong, extremely strong)
- Angry (Not at all, a little, somewhat, rather strong, extremely strong)
- Proud (Not at all, a little, somewhat, rather strong, extremely strong)

Q21 In your view, how large was the contribution of the following groups to the Anti-Japanese war effort?

- Communist Party (very little, relatively little, moderate, rather large, very large)
- Nationalist Party (very little, relatively little, moderate, rather large, very large)
- Other Chinese groups (very little, relatively little, moderate, rather large, very large)
- International aid (very little, relatively little, moderate, rather large, very large)

Q25 Do you agree with the following statement: The Japanese government has not made an adequate apology for its actions during the War of Japanese Aggression.

- Strongly agree
- Agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Disagree
- Strongly disagree

Q26 Do you agree with the following statement: Chinese leaders should quickly dispatch troops to the Diaoyu islands, even if doing so has a significant impact on the economy

- Strongly agree
- Agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Disagree
- Strongly disagree

Q28 How should Chinese defense spending change in the future, as a portion of total fiscal expenditure?

- Increase
- Remain the same
- Decrease
- Don't know/refuse to answer

Q52 Do you agree with the following statement: The best way to ensure China's peace and security is to increase China's military power.

- Strongly agree
- Agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Disagree
- Strongly disagree

Q53 Do you agree with the following statement: Even if I could choose any other country in the world, I would rather be a Chinese citizen.

- Strongly agree
- Agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Disagree
- Strongly disagree

Q54 Which of the following do you generally feel are characteristics of Japanese people?

- Militant (strongly agree; agree; neither agree nor disagree; disagree; strongly disagree)
- Rule-following (strongly agree; agree; neither agree nor disagree; disagree; strongly disagree)
- Consistent in word and deed (strongly agree; agree; neither agree nor disagree; disagree; strongly disagree)
- Fear the rise of China (strongly agree; agree; neither agree nor disagree; disagree; strongly disagree)

Q54 Which of the following do you generally feel are characteristics of Korean people?

- Militant (strongly agree; agree; neither agree nor disagree; disagree; strongly disagree)
- Rule-following (strongly agree; agree; neither agree nor disagree; disagree; strongly disagree)
- Consistent in word and deed (strongly agree; agree; neither agree nor disagree; disagree; strongly disagree)

- Fear the rise of China (strongly agree; agree; neither agree nor disagree; disagree; strongly disagree)

Q55 Which of the following do you generally feel are characteristics of Chinese people?

- Militant (strongly agree; agree; neither agree nor disagree; disagree; strongly disagree)
- Rule-following (strongly agree; agree; neither agree nor disagree; disagree; strongly disagree)
- Consistent in word and deed (strongly agree; agree; neither agree nor disagree; disagree; strongly disagree)
- Fear the rise of China (strongly agree; agree; neither agree nor disagree; disagree; strongly disagree)

Q32 If the government does not provide me with adequate medical care, education, or other services, I would:

- Go to court and sue
- Participate in a collective walk
- Find a government website to file complaint
- Find a 'back door'
- Do nothing
- Other (please specify) \_\_\_\_\_

Q33 If you are willing, you may provide your surname and province to a petition to the Japanese government to make an official apology and reparations for their actions during the war:

We the undersigned demand that Shinzo Abe to make a formal apology to the Chinese people for war crimes committed by the Japanese military and government during Japan's invasion and occupation of China.

- Willing (Please enter the date and your surname) \_\_\_\_\_
- Not willing

Q39 Please enter any comments or opinions you have regarding this survey:

---

---

---

---



# Amendment: How Propaganda Shapes Nationalism in China

November 11, 2019

Does propaganda inflame nationalism in China? If so, how? In the initial study described in our pre-analysis plan, we examined the effects of exposing respondents to nationalist political messages favored by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In this document, we describe a follow-up round of our survey experiment. Building upon the results from our first study, we administer a treatment for an additional type of nationalist message in addition to one of the previous treatments, and examine effects on the same set of main outcomes. However, we include a placebo video rather than a pure control, and make a few modifications to the survey instrument.

## 1 First Round: Results


Figure 1 shows the impact of the propaganda treatments on our main outcomes. Consistent with our pre-analysis plan, we present simple difference in means results that compare each treatment group to the control group. Parts (a) through (c) of the figure show that both propaganda treatments had a strong effect on all three indices measuring nationalist attitudes. The outcome has been standardized to aid interpretation, and a positive direction indicates more nationalist attitudes. On each dimension of nationalism, we found strong and statistically significant effects ranging from 0.10 to 0.38 of a standard deviation, depending

on the outcome and type of propaganda. These results differ substantially from previous studies that show that pro-regime propaganda has no effect on nationalism or may even have a negative effect.


Next, we examine the effect of the propaganda treatments on two measures of collective action, i.e. willingness to protest against foreign or domestic targets. With regard to foreign targets, Figure 1(d) shows that the soft propaganda treatment induces people to sign a quasi-anonymous petition targeting the Japanese government. While the raw results are statistically significant, once we apply a correction for multiple comparisons they do not reach significance. The results for this behavioral measure are only suggestive. With regard to protest against domestic targets, Figure 1(e) shows no significant effect on hypothetical willingness to protest against the government, with small positive estimates. While prior studies have shown that pro-regime propaganda discourages protest against the regime, we find no such effect with nationalist propaganda.

What mechanism does nationalist propaganda work through? In Figure 2 we examine two possibilities: updating beliefs about historical facts, or manipulating emotions. Viewing both clips caused large changes in self-reported levels of anger, consistent with the powerful emotional content of the clips. The high levels of anger produced by the soft propaganda clip — which contains a scene of a civilian shot in front of his family — may explain the larger effect it had on the petition, anti-foreign, and hawkish nationalism measures.

By contrast, we find that propaganda had only a small effect on beliefs about the CCP's role in the war against Japan. This is surprising because the party's role in defeating and reviving China is central to its legitimacy, and each clip emphasized the role of Communist guerillas in the war. These results suggest that nationalist propaganda can work to fan anger at foreign targets without necessarily improving individuals' evaluation of the ruling party's performance. In Tables A1-A3, we demonstrate that the effects described in this section are robust to controls for demographic information, education, urban residency, party affiliation, income, and hours watching television.




(a) National pride      (b) Anti-foreign nationalism      (c) Hawkish nationalism



(d) Signed the petition calling on the Japanese government to apologize.

(e) Would engage in street protest against Chinese government if provided poor services.

Figure 1: Estimated effects of propaganda compared to control group. Outcomes include attitude indexes (a) - (c), standardized for comparability, and a binary collective action measures, (d) - (e). Difference in means with two-sided 95 percent confidence interval.



(a) Emotions: Anger

(b) Beliefs: CCP was decisive in winning the war against Japan

Figure 2: Estimated effects of propaganda on emotions and beliefs, 1-5 scale for all answers. Difference in means with two-sided 95 percent confidence interval.

As Table 1 shows, the treatments induced differential attrition. Approximately 15 percent of the two treatment groups dropped out of the survey before completing the two treatments. Among those who dropped out, most did so without watching any of the video. In the hard propaganda treatment group, 87 percent of those who dropped out did not watch any portion of the video; in the soft propaganda treatment, 82 percent of those who dropped out did not watch any of the video. This difference in rate of clicking on the video is not statistically significant.

Table 1: Attrition across treatment groups.

	N	N completed	Attrition
Hard propaganda	1663	1412	15.1%
Soft propaganda	1672	1430	15.5%
No clip shown	1708	1674	2.0%

We take two approaches to understanding how attrition might influence the results, as recommended in Gerber and Green (2012). First, we re-weight the data based on the

**Table 2: Reweighted results to account for missingness, using inverse propensity score weighting as described in Gerber and Green (2012).**

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Patriotism	Anti-foreign	Hawkish	Patriotism	Anti-foreign	Hawkish
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Hard propaganda	0.193*** (0.036)	0.262*** (0.036)	0.118*** (0.038)			
Soft propaganda				0.083** (0.038)	0.367*** (0.036)	0.188*** (0.038)
Constant	-0.094*** (0.025)	-0.198*** (0.025)	-0.095*** (0.027)	-0.094*** (0.027)	-0.198*** (0.026)	-0.095*** (0.027)
Observations	2,959	2,948	2,751	2,974	2,966	2,781
R <sup>2</sup>	0.010	0.018	0.003	0.002	0.033	0.009
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.009	0.018	0.003	0.001	0.033	0.008

*Note:*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

**Table 3: Trimming bounds for each estimated effect.**

	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Hard propaganda - Anti-foreign	0.02	0.50
Hard propaganda - Patriotism	-0.15	0.48
Hard propaganda - Hawkishness	-0.12	0.45
Hard propaganda - Anger	0.57	1.88
Soft propaganda - Anti-foreign	0.12	0.63
Soft propaganda - Patriotism	-0.28	0.42
Soft propaganda - Hawkishness	-0.09	0.52
Soft propaganda - Anger	0.69	1.95

inverse predicted probability of completing the survey (Gerber & Green 2012, Chapter 7). A key assumption of this approach is that missingness is independent of potential outcomes conditional on the pre-treatment covariates we observe, which is a strong assumption. Table 2 presents reweighted results for the main attitudinal measures. The other results also remain unchanged.

A second approach is to use sensitivity analysis to create bounds for plausible treatment effects. We use the trimming bounds approach outlined in Gerber and Green (2012) and Lee (2009). With this approach, we drop the upper and lower tails of the treatment group

on each outcome measure, based on the differential amount of missingness in each group, then recalculate the estimated effects. A key assumption of this approach is monotonicity, or that treatment affects sample selection in one direction. The fact that most attriters did not watch any portion of the video arguably strengthens the plausibility of this assumption, but it is ultimately untestable. Table 3 presents trimming bounds for each estimate. The key results for anti-foreign nationalism and emotional response hold, although the other bounds suggest that there are plausible scenarios in which attrition may have influenced the other results.

To further account for this problem, and to examine additional outcomes and explanations, we plan to conduct a second round of the study, as described below.

## 2 Second Round: Pre-Analysis Plan

The second round will proceed in two waves. The first will sample approximately 2,000 respondents drawn from an online panel. The general design of the survey will largely be the same. We will collect the same pre-treatment covariates, and include the pre-treatment attention check to identify low-quality respondents. To further ensure quality responses, we will limit respondents to desktop and tablets.

### 2.1 *Treatment conditions and placebo*

The new version of the survey will include a placebo to account for possible attrition induced by watching a video. It will also include a new treatment condition. Respondents will be randomly sorted into three conditions with equal probability.

- **Placebo:** The placebo video will be an excerpt of a nature documentary of approximately the same duration as the other treatments (3 to 4 minutes). The nature documentary, narrated in Mandarin Chinese, focuses on arctic seals and killer whales. We selected a documentary that is non-political in nature and that we believe is unlikely to lead to changes in feelings of nationalism or patriotism. It is possible that the

documentary could induce changes in emotional states, but we believe it is unlikely to induce anger, which is one of the main focuses of our study.

- **Treatment 1: Anti-Japanese War:** We retain the soft propaganda treatment from our original study, which is an excerpt from a television show about the Sino-Japanese War called “The New Snow Leopard.”
- **Treatment 2: Hong Kong Protests:** A new treatment condition will include clips circulated by state media (CCTV) about the Hong Kong protests. These clips focus on (1) violence by the protesters, (2) their rejection of symbols of the CCP-led state by throwing ink on the state seal and throwing the national flag into the water; and (3) allegations that the protests were instigated by foreign forces. This treatment reflects widespread propaganda circulated by the CCP in recent months, which we hypothesize is likely to inflame nationalist anger.

## 2.2 Outcomes

We measure the same set as main outcomes as in the prior round (anti-foreign nationalism, hawkishness, and pro-Chinese patriotism), and construct them using the same questions we asked in the previous survey. However, there are a few exceptions pertaining to the anti-foreign nationalism index. First, in order to match the content of the Hong Kong protests treatment, we have changed the “warlike” attribute from the first wave to “violent” for all outcomes.

For the Hong Kong treatment and control groups, will ask respondents about their attitudes towards Hong Kong citizens using the same battery of questions used for Japanese respondents (whether Hong Kong citizens are consistent, rule-following, violent, and untrustworthy). We further ask two questions which we will incorporate into an alternate version of the anti-foreign nationalism index. In these questions, we ask respondents to what extent they agree with the following statement: (1) The United States is responsible for the Hong Kong protests (2) Western countries have been trying to compromise China’s sovereignty

and territorial integrity. In our analysis, we will compare the results between the first and second round surveys using both the original construction of the anti-foreign nationalism index and the alternate question including these two additional questions. In addition, we will examine whether the two treatments influence anti-foreign sentiment more generally, not just towards a specific nationality, by combining our measures for American, Korean, and Japanese people, using the same procedure for constructing the index.

We further ask respondents to what extent they agree with the statement “China’s government is working for the people and responsive to the needs of the people.” This final question is drawn from [Huang \(2018\)](#) and is meant to reflect respondents’ attitudes towards the Chinese government. We again assess respondents’ willingness to protest against the Chinese government. We also eliminate the question which assessed respondents’ willingness to protest against the Japanese government, since the results were not significant once adjusted for multiple comparisons, and since the outcome is not relevant to our Hong Kong treatment.

### *2.3 Analysis*

Our analysis will be carried out as before. Corrections for multiple comparisons will be reported in the paper’s appendix and discussed in the main text.

### *2.4 Sample attrition*

We will examine whether there is differential attrition between the placebo and treatment groups. If there is significant differential attrition, we will present reweighted results and trimming bound results in the paper’s appendix.

### *2.5 Follow-up round to measure persistence*

To measure potential persistence of the effect, we will re-contact respondents 5 to 7 days after the first round. Based on the experience of our partner, we expect approximately 50 percent of respondents to participate in the second round.



## References

- Gerber, A. S., & Green, D. P. (2012). *Field experiments: Design, analysis, and interpretation*. WW Norton.
- Huang, H. (2018). The pathology of hard propaganda. *Journal of Politics*, 80(3), 1034–1038.
- Lee, D. S. (2009). Training, wages, and sample selection: Estimating sharp bounds on treatment effects. *The Review of Economic Studies*, 76(3), 1071–1102.